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CASENOTE

NISSAN MOTOR CO. V. NISSAN COMPUTER CORP.:
THE POINT AT WHICH FAME IS DETERMINED
UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK
DILUTION ACT
Bruce C. Piontkowskit & Matthew S. Kenefick
In August 2004, the Ninth Circuit held that under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act 1 ("FTDA") the first commercial use of a
mark in commerce by a defendant fixes the time for measuring the
fame of a plaintiff's mark.2
In 1996, Congress passed the FTDA. 3 It affords a markholder
protection against the "whittling away of the value of a trademark
when it's used to identify different products."4 In the context of a
scheme intended to protect the public from being deceived,5 the
FTDA protects the owner's investment in his mark. 6 Essentially

f Bruce C. Piontkowski is a partner at Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley. Mr.
Piontkowski achieved a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of California at Davis, and
his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law. His
intellectual property litigation practice includes patent, trademark and copyright infringement,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition. With substantial litigation and trial
experience, Mr. Piontkowski has represented technology clients in matters resulting in published
caselaw.
: Matthew S. Kenefick is an associate at Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, LLP. Mr.
Kenefick achieved his Bachelor of Arts degree from California State University at San Jose, and
his law degree from Santa Clara University School of Law. His practice extends to many areas,
including intellectual property, real estate, and commercial litigation.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2004).
2. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004).
3. Id.at 1009.
4. Id.at 1011.
5. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(stating that the basic policy behind the law of unfair competition is to protect the public from
being deceived).
6. Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1012.
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creating a "right in gross," 7 it 8 is not surprising that the FTDA has
been the subject of controversy.
In Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., Nissan Motor
Company ("Nissan Motor") brought suit against Nissan Computer
Corporation ("Nissan Computer") alleging, among other things,
dilution under the FTDA. 9
Nissan Motor manufactures and sells automotive products.
Initially registering its mark in 1959, Nissan Motor had been
marketing its vehicles under "Nissan" since 1983.0 In fact, between
the years 1985 to 1991, Nissan Motor expended $898 million in
advertising and promotion. 1
Nissan Computer is owned by Uzi Nissan. 12 Since 1980, Mr.
Nissan has used his name in connection with goods and services.' 3 In
1991, Mr. Nissan established Nissan Computer Corporation. 14 In
1994, he registered the Internet domain
www.nissan.com to advertise
5
computer related goods and services.'
In 1995, Nissan Motor expressed to Nissan Computer "great
concern" about its use of the Nissan domain name. 16 In October
1999, Nissan Motor offered to purchase the domain.' 7
After
8
negotiations failed, Nissan Motor brought suit.'
The District Court resolved the matter on summary judgment.' 9
It concluded, among other things, that Nissan Motor was entitled to
injunctive relief under the FTDA.20 Specifically, it found that in
1994, when Nissan Motor was already a famous mark, Nissan
Computer's use diluted the Nissan mark.2' Both parties appealed.22

7.

Id. at 1011.

8. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (requiring actual
dilution for an FTDA claim to succeed).
9.

Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1006.

10. Id. at 1007.
11. Id. at 1014.
12. Id. at 1007.
13.
Mr. Nissan offered automobile repair services under "Nissan Foreign Car Mobile
Repair Service" and later operated an import/export business under "Nissan International, Ltd."
Id.
14. Id.
15.

Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1007.

16.

Id.

17.

Id. at1008.

18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 1008.
Id.

21.

Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1008-09.
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Upon review, the Ninth Circuit explained that under the FTDA,
injunctive relief is available upon a showing that:
* The mark is famous;
* The defendant is making commercial use of the mark in
commerce; and
* The defendant's use began after the plaintiffs mark
became famous.2 3
The Ninth Circuit went on to join the 2nd, 5th, and 8th circuits in
holding that the FTDA is not retroactive because it only authorizes
prospective relief24
The main focus of the Ninth Circuit's review was the FTDA
"grandfathering clause," which requires the fame of the plaintiffs
mark to pre-date the defendant's use.25 Such provision sets forth:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ...to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
26
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark ....
The Ninth Circuit found error in the Lower Court's interpretation
of the phrase "such use" as referring to Nissan Computer's 1994
registration of the "Nissan" domain. 7 Specifically, it explained that
the phrase "such use" refers to a use that, assuming it occurs after
another's mark has become famous, would arguably dilute the mark.2 8
It further stated that, given the broad scope of protection afforded by
the FTDA,29 this refers to any commercial use of a famous mark.3 °
As such, ". . .any commercial use of a famous mark in commerce is
arguably a diluting use that fixes the time by which famousness is to

22. Id. at 1009.
23. Id. at 1010. It is worth noting that "famous" is an exceedingly high standard reserved
to "those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even non-competing uses can
impinge on their value." Id. at 1011 (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868,
875 (9th Cir. 1999)).
24. Id. at 1009-10. This, however, appears to be inconsistent with 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2) which provides, in the presence of intentional conduct, for disgorgement of a
defendant's profits, compensation of a plaintiff's damages, and costs of the suit.
25. ld. at 1010.
26. Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1010 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis
added)).
27. Id.at 1010-11, 1013.
28. Id.
29. The FTDA affords protection in the absence of competition between the markholder
and the other parties or a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. Id. at 1011.
30. Id. at 1013.
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be measured.
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit found that Nissan
Computer's incorporation and use of Nissan to sell computers in
199132 was its first use of the mark in commerce, thereby setting this
date as the point at which to measure Nissan Motor's degree of
fame.33 Because triable issues of material fact existed as to the fame
of Nissan Motor's mark as of 1991, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
34
case.

In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the
proposition that the fame of the Nissan mark should be measured as
35
of 1994, when Nissan Computer registered the Nissan domain.
Specifically, it explained that fame is measured by the first arguably
diluting use, and not by the first use that a plaintiff finds
objectionable.36 It further stated that, although it was not until 1994
that Nissan Computer used the mark by itself, dilution may occur
even in the presence of other identifiers.3 7
By setting the measuring date at the first use, rather than the first
objectionable use, the Ninth Circuit's holding will likely cause
companies with famous marks to more aggressively pursue dilution
claims. Specifically, the failure to prosecute can result in mark
abandonment.3 8 With the first commercial use of a mark in commerce
being construed as "arguably dilutive," a markholder risks
abandonment for failure to promptly prosecute a dilution claim.
Further, failure to prosecute may also subject a markholder to the
defense of laches. Specifically, a defendant who is prejudiced by a
plaintiff's delay in bringing suit may assert the defense of laches. 39 In
cases of continuing acts, such as the unauthorized use of a mark, this
delay is measured from when the defendant first begins the
challenged conduct.4 ° With a defendant's first commercial use of a
mark in commerce being the measuring point for fame, the use may
31.
Id.
32.
The Ninth Circuit stated, however, that upon remand, the Lower Court could find that
one of Uzi Nissan's earlier uses of the mark is the point at which to measure fame. Id. at 1011.
33.
34.

Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1020.
Id. at 1014-15.

35.

Id. at 1010, 1012-13.

36.

Id. at 1012.

37.

Id. at 1007, 1012.

38. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) ("A mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned' ... [w]hen any
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the
mark to ... lose its significance ....

39.
40.

(emphasis added)).

See Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989).
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
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also be deemed when the defendant's conduct began, thereby
commencing the period for laches. Accordingly, a markholder who
fails to promptly bring suit risks having such a defense asserted
against him.
The added pressures to promptly bring suit, however, place upon
a markholder the difficult task of bringing its case after "actual
dilution ' 41 has occurred, but before delay in prosecution has
compromised its rights. Further, marginally famous marks may, at
the time of the measuring date, be left without protection. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit's holding makes an already difficult case even more
difficult. .

41.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (requiring actual dilution
for an FTDA claim).
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